Defense counsel moves to exclude. The authentication foundation is insufficient. No human created this record, no human can authenticate it, and there is no specific rule that addresses what it is.
That motion is going to keep coming. Courts are handling machine-generated records at a pace the existing rules weren't written for: automated sensor data, GPS logs, server timestamps, blockchain anchors. Practitioners have been stretching FRE 901(b)(9) and 902(13) to cover them. That works. But it's a workaround, and the Judicial Conference apparently agreed. Proposed FRE 707, approved in June 2025, was designed to fill this gap directly. The public comment period ran through February 2026 and is now closed. Here is what the proposed rule's framework means for blockchain-anchored evidence.
The Gap in Existing Rules
FRE 901(b)(9) authenticates evidence produced by a process that generates an accurate result. It has worked for blockchain records, but it requires foundation, typically expert testimony or certification establishing that the process is reliable. For a technology with a decade-plus track record and public cryptographic documentation, that foundation requirement is often more friction than it should be.
FRE 902(13) provides self-authentication for records generated by an electronic process, when accompanied by written certification. This is cleaner and more directly applicable than 901(b)(9) for machine-generated records. But both rules were written with a broader mandate. Neither was built around the specific characteristics of automated, system-generated outputs where no human author exists at all.
That definitional distinction matters. A document typed in Word has a human author, even if the file format was machine-generated. A blockchain anchor record has no author. The hash was computed from the file's bytes. The transaction was broadcast to the network. The ledger recorded it. No human typed any of that output. Proposed FRE 707 creates a dedicated authentication path for that category of record.
What the Proposed Rule Would Require
The proposed FRE 707 framework centers on three showings. The proponent must establish that the record came from a defined system or process, that the system was operating correctly when the record was generated, and that the record accurately reflects what the system produced.
This tracks the existing 901(b)(9) process-reliability analysis. But as a standalone rule with its own evidentiary framework, it would provide clearer guidance for courts and reduce the need to retrofit blockchain authentication into general-purpose authentication standards.
For blockchain timestamps, all three elements map cleanly.
The system is well-defined. SHA-256 is a documented cryptographic hash function. Polygon and Bitcoin are public blockchains with years of operating history, published specifications, and independent validator networks. The anchoring process, from hash computation to on-chain transaction, is technically reproducible and publicly documented.
Correct operation is verifiable after the fact. Anyone can run the same SHA-256 hash against the original file and confirm it matches the anchored hash. Anyone can query the blockchain and confirm the transaction exists in the recorded block. ProofLedger's public verification endpoint at proofledger.io/api/v1/verify?hash=<sha256> requires no authentication and returns the full proof record, including chain transaction data and explorer links, to any third party without needing access to ProofLedger's servers.
Accurate output follows directly from the first two showings. A match between the file hash and the anchored hash is cryptographic confirmation of accuracy. There is no gap between what the process produced and what the record says it produced.
Why Dual-Chain Verification Strengthens the Argument
ProofLedger anchors to both Polygon and Bitcoin. The process-reliability argument is the reason.
Polygon provides near-instant confirmation. Bitcoin provides a daily batch anchor with a merkle proof: a cryptographic structure that positions the ProofLedger transaction within a specific block in the longest chain. That proof can be validated offline, without any third-party dependency. It doesn't require ProofLedger to be operating. It doesn't require access to any ProofLedger server. The math holds independently.
For the proposed FRE 707 framework's second element (correct operation), having two independent chains with different consensus mechanisms, different validator sets, and separate operating histories provides corroboration that no single-chain anchor can offer. If the reliability of one system is challenged, the second provides independent confirmation.
This isn't redundancy for its own sake. It's a process-reliability argument built into the architecture.
Where the Rule Stands
The public comment period closed in February 2026. The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules is now reviewing submitted comments before the proposed rule moves to the Standing Committee, then to the Supreme Court for transmission to Congress. Under the standard Rules Enabling Act process, that sequence takes time. Courts will continue applying 901(b)(9) and 902(13) to machine-generated records until FRE 707 is formally adopted.
But the proposed framework is already signaling where foundation requirements for machine-generated records are heading. A foundation built around the FRE 707 factors will be more defensible under 901(b)(9) than one that ignores them, even before the rule is formally on the books.
What This Means Monday Morning
If you're handling matters that involve blockchain-anchored timestamps, three things are worth doing before the rule is finalized.
Keep documentation of the anchoring process, not just the certificate. That means the hash computation, the API submission, the transaction ID on each chain, and the timestamp at the moment of anchoring. The proposed FRE 707 framework requires showing the system operated correctly when the record was made. Your documentation needs to answer that question directly.
Understand what each chain's anchor provides. Polygon anchors are near-instant. Bitcoin anchors take longer but produce a merkle proof that can be validated offline without relying on any third party. In a dispute, that distinction is relevant to the "accurate output" showing.
Use the public verification endpoint when you verify. The response at proofledger.io/api/v1/verify?hash=<sha256> is a third-party-accessible, no-authentication record of the anchor's existence. Preserving that response at the time of verification creates a contemporaneous record that the proof was verifiable and intact.
FRE 902(13) remains the most efficient authentication path for blockchain records under current law. That stays true. But proposed FRE 707 tells you what questions courts will be asking about machine-generated records going forward. Build foundations that answer those questions now, before you need to answer them under oath.
Anchoring documentation and public verification at proofledger.io.
