Age checks are becoming the new login wall

The internet is getting a new bouncer.

For years, the default online experience was simple: open the app, tap through the warning, and get inside. That era is starting to crack. In the last two days, news around Minnesota's proposed social media law, UK police support for tougher under-16 restrictions, Malaysia's age verification standards for platforms, and fresh privacy reporting from Arizona all pointed in the same direction. More websites and apps are going to ask users to prove age before they can participate.

I get why this is happening. Parents are tired. Schools are tired. Lawmakers are looking at the mental health, sexual exploitation, addictive design, and algorithmic rabbit holes around children online and deciding that vague platform promises are not enough.

But the hard part is not the slogan. The hard part is the checkpoint.

Safety rules can create privacy databases

An age gate sounds harmless until you ask what proof the site needs. A birth date typed into a form is easy to fake. A government ID is harder to fake, but now a social app, verification vendor, or data broker may touch documents that were never meant to float around the internet.

That tradeoff matters. If age checks become common, a normal web visit could start to feel like opening a bank account. Upload an ID. Scan a face. Let a third party estimate your age. Trust that the data is deleted. Trust that it is not breached later. Trust that the system does not quietly expand from child safety into general identity tracking.

That is a lot of trust to demand from people who have spent the last decade watching companies mishandle far less sensitive data.

Developers will inherit the messy version

Policy debates often treat verification like a switch: require it, then platforms comply. Anyone who builds software knows it will be messier than that.

Small apps will need vendors. Vendors will need integrations. Teams will need to decide what they store, what they log, what happens when verification fails, and how to support users who do not have the expected documents. There will be edge cases: shared devices, foster care, undocumented users, VPNs, people who look younger or older than they are, and adults who simply do not want to hand over more personal information to read a website.

The product question is not only, "Can we verify age?" It is, "Can we do it without building a surveillance habit into the front door?"

Parents still cannot outsource discipleship to a popup

There is a faith-and-tech angle here that is easy to miss. Age verification may reduce some harm, and I hope it does. But no law can teach a child wisdom. No popup can replace a parent who pays attention. No platform rule can form self-control, patience, or discernment.

That does not mean regulation is useless. It means regulation is not salvation. Families still need conversations about what apps are doing to attention, comparison, lust, anger, and loneliness. Churches and youth leaders need to talk about the internet as a formation environment, not just a list of dangers.

The web trains us. Sometimes it trains us quietly. That is why this age-check debate is bigger than compliance.

What good age checks should look like

If age verification becomes normal, the least-bad version should be boring, narrow, and temporary.

Collect the minimum proof needed for the specific legal requirement.
Keep raw documents away from the app whenever possible.
Use vendors that publish clear deletion and retention rules.
Give users a real explanation, not a dark-pattern consent screen.
Do not reuse age checks as a general identity system.

That last one is the line I keep coming back to. A child-safety rule should not become an excuse to make everyone easier to track.

The next login wall

Cookie banners trained people to click without reading. Paywalls trained people to decide whether content is worth the price. Age gates may train people to hand over identity proof as casually as an email address.

Maybe some of that is necessary. Maybe parts of the internet really should be harder for kids to enter. But if we build the next version of the web around constant identity checks, we should be honest about what we are trading away.

Protecting children is worth serious effort. It is also worth doing carefully. A safer internet that normalizes more surveillance is not an obvious win. It is a warning label with good intentions.